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Abstract 
 
Since 2014, Volkswagen (VW) has been enthralled       
in a reputation-tarnishing cheating scandal that has       
raised questions regarding how collaborative cheating      
unfolds in organizational settings. While the      
behavioral ethics literature provides some insights, this       
literature is largely confined to individual decision       
makers and so little work examining how collaborative        
cheating emerges has been done. Therefore, with this        
case study, we draw on various data sources (e.g.,         
court case summaries, investigative reporting,     
technical reports, popular press outlets, and publically       
available employee interviews) and use case study       
methodology (i.e., grounded theory, open-systems     
diagnostics) to construct a process model that explains        
how collaborative cheating emerges in organizational      
settings. Theoretical and practical implications are      
also​ ​discussed.  
 
1.​ ​Introduction  
 
Many researchers extol the virtues of collaboration       
in organizational settings [1,2]. Collaboration has been       
defined as a process by which individuals with various         
backgrounds come together and, through interaction,      
information sharing, and coordination of activities      
learn and, ultimately, perform [2]. Collaboration is       
often viewed as a vehicle that facilitates ongoing        
learning, results in innovative strategies for competing       
in the marketplace, promotes diversity, and other       
positive​ ​outcomes​ ​for​ ​organizations.  
However, there are times in organizational life       
when individuals within a team setting decide to cheat,         
and coordinate their activities as needed (e.g., students        
sharing tests to help their peers, scientists using        
questionable research practices to ensure a study gets        
published). Though we understand what drives      
individuals to cheat, such as the facilitating conditions        
(e.g., social norms) and individual differences (e.g.,       
moral disengagement) [4-9], what compels individuals      
to contribute to and sustain a collective cheating effort         
(i.e., collaborative cheating) is deserving of greater       
scrutiny than what has been done previously [e.g., 3].         
This is partly because little research examines how        
unethical decision making occurs at the collective level        
[10]. One likely reason why little research exists on         
collaborative cheating is that studying it presents many        
problems that are not easily broached conventionally       
(e.g., experimental research), not the least of which        
involves gaining access to data on ethically and legally         
sensitive​ ​matters​ ​[11].  
Given that organizations are increasingly relying      
on group decision making to compete in the        
marketplace, understanding what drives individuals to      
contribute to a collective cheating effort is critical.        
Recently, the Volkswagen emissions scandal, which      
involved many managers and engineers who helped       
create, implement, and conceal a device that would        
cheat emissions testing, provided scholars with the       
opportunity to understand how collaborative cheating      
emerges. Here, we use case study methodology to        
explain how collaborative cheating emerged at VW in        
order to form propositions regarding how this       
phenomenon emerges in organizational settings in      
general, providing direction for future study. To       
diagnose the causes of collaborative cheating at VW,        
we apply the open-systems model [12], a commonly        
used diagnostic framework in organizational research.      
This model acknowledges that organization’s act on       
information in their larger environment, transforming      
inputs (e.g., human capital, materials) into outputs       
(e.g., goods, services, ideas) via transformation      
processes (e.g., social components, and technological      
components). How well these outputs satisfy      
constraints in the environment (e.g., regulatory needs       
and customer demands) serves as feedback for the        
organizational system, which can result in changes to        
the system or how it should be regulated. By applying          
this diagnostic model to our data, we hope to illuminate          
the numerous influences both inside and outside VW        
that contributed to the emergence of collaborative       
cheating.  
We use case study methods for the following        
reasons. First, compared to quantitative approaches,      
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 qualitative methods flexibly capture the richness of       
collective constructs and processes in ways that can        
lead to generalizable and testable theory [13,14].       
Second, the Volkswagen scandal has birthed a large        
volume of information on the inner-workings of VW        
leading up to the creation, implementation, and       
concealment of the defeat device, making these       
methods well-suited to the available data. Third, ​a case         
study allows us to form a complex yet detailed         
understanding of the role of context (e.g., regulations,        
culture, leadership) and causal mechanisms that shape       
the emergence of collaborative cheating behavior [15].       
Researchers have suggested that we might learn       
something by studying specific cases of organizational       
failures [16]. Here, we seek to do just that by          
answering​ ​the​ ​following​ ​research​ ​question: 
What are the mechanisms that explain how       
collaborative cheating, a form of collective and       
coordinated unethical behavior, emerges in     
organizations? 
 
1.1.​ ​An​ ​Overview​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Volkswagen​ ​Emissions 
Scandal 
 
Since 2014, VW has been embroiled in a cheating         
scandal that has tarnished its reputation. In 2014,        
researchers studying VW diesel-burning vehicles     
identified a large discrepancy between the emissions       
levels produced under laboratory and typical driving       
conditions [17]. This discrepancy was later attributed       
to a defeat device (software) created under the        
direction of VW management. This defeat device       
enabled equipped vehicles to respond to laboratory       
testing procedures by constraining emissions to levels       
deemed acceptable by the Environmental Protection      
Agency (EPA). When performing under typical driving       
conditions, equipped vehicles produced between five      
and thirty-five times the level of toxins deemed        
acceptable by the EPA [17]. Such excess pollution was         
predicted to cause approximately 59 premature deaths,       
31 cases of chronic bronchitis, 34 hospital admissions,        
120,000 days of restricted activity—including lost      
work days—210,000 days with lower-respiratory     
problems and 33,000 days with increased use of        
asthma inhalers. The overall cost burden would be        
approximately​ ​$450​ ​million​ ​[18].  
In 2017, a court concluded that there was        
sufficient evidence indicating that certain VW      
managers in power during the scandal (i.e., CEO of         1
1​ ​​For​ ​anonymity,​ ​all​ ​names​ ​throughout​ ​the​ ​paper​ ​are​ ​replaced​ ​with 
generic​ ​identifiers​ ​(e.g.,​ ​Executive​ ​A,​ ​Engineer​ ​A,​ ​etc.) 
VW AG, CEO of VW Group of America, and CEO of           
the VW Passenger Cars brand) acted with scienter,        
which refers to a mental state embracing intent to         
deceive,​ ​manipulate,​ ​or​ ​defraud.  
 
1.2.​ ​Study​ ​Purpose 
 
We use qualitative research methods to examine       
key historical events in the VW scandal, namely the (1)          
creation, (2) implementation and refinement, and (3)       
concealment of the defeat device. We use this timeline         
to construct a process model describing how       
collaborative cheating emerges. Our data come from       
multiple sources (e.g., legal documents, investigative      
reporting, technical reports, popular press outlets, and       
employee interviews). The high-profile nature of the       
VW scandal has led (and continues to lead) to the          
creation of many documents, making it a prime        
candidate​ ​for​ ​analysis​ ​via​ ​case​ ​study​ ​[15,19]. 
 
2.​ ​Case​ ​Study​ ​Methods  
 
Following guidance from the literature [14,20], we       
began our case study with a focal concept –         
collaborative cheating – to direct our analysis. We        
examine all relevant factors within the context of the         
VW scandal (i.e., management, culture, industry      
setting, organizational strategy, individual histories) in      
order to understand how individuals within VW       
conspired to cheat emissions testing. We define       
collaborative cheating as cheating that occurs when       
individuals of various backgrounds interact to create,       
implement, and sustain solutions to problems that       
violate ethical obligations or norms. This definition       
shares features of a commonly used definition of        
collaboration that we introduced earlier, such as the        
presence of a variety of expertise that is brought         
together via information sharing, shared creative      
problem solving, and coordination within the group       
[2]. However, collaborative cheating would involve      
factors that incline individuals to disregard ethical       
principles, or to morally disengage from their behavior        
[6,21], in the pursuit of short-term self-interest.       
Collaborative cheating is emergent and involves      
sharing knowledge and expertise. However, agents      
contributing to a collective cheating effort recognize       
ethical wrongdoings and demonstrate a willingness to       
disregard such obligations and rationalize their      
behavior (e.g., for the greater good of their company,         
their own self-interest, or both). It also differs from         
individual cheating, which involves no voluntary      
assistance from others (e.g., cheating on a test by         
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 keeping correct answers written on a notecard that is         
taped​ ​to​ ​the​ ​bill​ ​of​ ​a​ ​baseball​ ​cap). 
 
2.1.​ ​Data​ ​Collection 
 
Data were collected in early 2017. We gathered        
literature on the VW emissions scandal using Google’s        
search engine to access primary and secondary sources.        
We took steps to ensure a thorough search by training          
four research assistants to look through 10 pages of         
Google search returns, per search term, as well as any          
relevant sources cited therein. A source was considered        
relevant and included in our dataset if it contained         
narrative descriptions on the inner-workings of VW       
related to (1) the creation and refinement of the defeat          
device, (2) the implementation of the defeat device,        
and (3) the lengthy concealment of the defeat device.         
Sources included legal documents, investigative     
journalist reports, technical reports, employee     
interviews,​ ​and​ ​popular​ ​press​ ​articles.  
 
2.2.​ ​Timeline​ ​Construction 
 
In order to focus on the most salient actions of VW           
as they related to the creation, implementation, and        
cover up of the defeat device, we constructed a         
timeline of relevant events and links to sources. We         
identified key actors (e.g., VW managers and       
engineers) along with actions that pertained to the        
creation, implementation, and concealment of the      
defeat device. To ensure that the timeline was credible,         
research assistants were tasked with being devil’s       
advocates and challenging both the emerging narrative       
and the credibility of sources of the narrative.        
Additionally, the authors critiqued the timeline and       
gathered more information as needed or directed the        
research​ ​assistants​ ​to​ ​do​ ​so.  
 
2.3.​ ​Data​ ​Analysis​ ​and​ ​Model​ ​Construction 
 
In order to build a causal model that explains how          
collaborative cheating emerges, we used grounded      
theory [22], which “begins with observations or data        
and seeks to induce empirical generalizations and       
concepts that reflect the contours or features of data”         
[13]. Further, drawing on Stake’s guidance for       
case-study research [20], we bounded the case by        
focusing on generating concepts that explain how       
collaborative cheating emerged at VW. We used our        
timeline as a guide for immersing ourselves in the data.          
While seeking to draw inferences, we also ensured that         
the supporting evidence was appropriate for a given        
event. For instance, one of our sources linked VW’s         
behavior to policy issued by the EPA, but did not cite           
the EPA directly. So we identified the EPA document         
that issued this policy. Over time, we refined the data          
and our timeline to more closely align the two and,          
following Stake [20], clarified event descriptions to       
draw readers’ attention to structural and procedural       
factors relating to the emergence of collaborative       
cheating at VW. In drawing inferences, we drew on the          
highest quality data in our dataset, which often meant         
drawing directly from legal documents. Articles from       
the popular press often corroborated the narrative we        
constructed, leant us possible interpretations of the       
facts, or served as a resource that helped us identify          
more credible facts (e.g., locating additional cases/legal       
proceedings, interviews, etc.). Once these events were       
constructed, they were clustered into themes, which       
informed the construction of a causal model       
explaining how collaborative cheating emerges (see      
Figure 1). Lastly, drawing on the open-systems       
approach [12], we built a causal model ​articulating the         
mechanisms that might explain how collaborative      
cheating emerged at VW and, correspondingly, how       
such​ ​phenomena​ ​might​ ​emerge​ ​in​ ​general​. 
 
3.​ ​How​ ​Collaborative​ ​Cheating​ ​Unfolded​ ​at 
VW 
 
In crafting our timeline, it quickly became apparent        
that the behavior occurring at VW was not an isolated,          
one-time event. Rather, it was an ongoing effort        
reflecting many decision points faced by multiple VW        
employees from various departments and hierarchical      
levels who were making unique contributions over a        
substantial period of time. Consistent with our original        
intentions, we viewed the scandal as unfolding in three         
stages: (1) the creation of the defeat device        
[1999–2006], (2) the implementation and refinement of       
the defeat device [2007–2013], and (3) the       
concealment (and revelation) of the defeat device’s       
existence [2014–present]. Table 1 lists those events       
most relevant to our analysis and links these events to          
emergent themes (our complete timeline, along with       
supporting data, is available for interested readers as        
supplemental online material. See    
https://osf.io/w8zyx/​). We now summarize key events      
from​ ​these​ ​three​ ​periods. 
 
3.1.​ ​Creation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Defeat​ ​Device 
 
In the 1990s, with the amendment of the Clean Air          
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 Act, the U.S. began a process of tightening emissions         
regulations, with the phase-in of new standards       
scheduled for 2004. Independently, in 1999, Audi       
engineers created software that could defeat European       
emissions testing. In 2006, following threats from VW        
AG’s CEO (​Executive A​) – who had a reputation for          
firing engineers who did not meet his exacting        
standards – that employees would lose their jobs if VW          
could not sell diesel engines in the U.S, two         
department heads (​Manager E, Head of VW’s Engine        
Development After-Treatment Department and    
Manager D, Head of Diesel Engine Development for        
VW​), knowing both that their engines exceeded       
emissions standards and how U.S. regulators would       
test VW vehicles, led the team that would create the          
defeat device. During this time, a VW employee        
acquired software from ​Company A (an automotive       
engineering company specializing in software,     
electronics, and technology which VW owned 50% of)        
to create the EA189 engine that would be capable of          
defeating​ ​emissions​ ​testing.  
Several themes emerge from this stage in the        
scandal. The creation of the defeat device software by         
Audi, a subsidiary of VW, suggests that the VW         
leadership developed a pervasive culture that      
encouraged the use of unethical means to attain market         
superiority. While the unethical leadership literature      
draws attention to how such leaders encourage       
subordinates to use any means to achieve market        
superiority [23], little field data exists examining how        
unethical leadership encourages individuals to     
collaboratively​ ​cheat,​ ​a​ ​point​ ​to​ ​which​ ​we​ ​now​ ​turn. 
Moving closer to the creation of the defeat device,         
our data suggest that authority or bullying from        
leadership along with normative pressures can drive       
individuals within a group to decide to contribute to a          
collaborative cheating effort. While the influence of       
authority and conformity on individual decisions are       
fairly well-documented social psychological    
phenomena (e.g., administer lethal shocks, deliver      
incorrect answers in a group setting to avoid standing         
out, go along with a bad idea) [24-26], their role in           
causing collaborative cheating is not. Our data suggest        
that authority and normative pressures drove      
employees to collaborate out of short-term self-interest,       
generating solutions that were desirable from the       
perspective of their superiors’. Such findings are       
mirrored in the available literature [27]. However, this        
literature has not suggested a link between such        
organizational structures and collaborative cheating.     
The data we have covered suggest that unethical        
leaders can promote collaborative cheating by creating       
a climate of fear that facilitates employees’ collective        
moral disengagement from ethical obligations [28]. In       
other words, leaders motivate employees to cheat, not        
for ​VW, but to spare themselves (at least, in the          
short-term). Scholars examining causes of unethical      
pro-organizational behavior [4,5,6] might be best      
positioned to study this phenomena (see 5 for an         
exemplar). Additionally, while a wealth of literature       
exists on unethical or destructive leadership [23,29],       
we identified only one study linking such leadership to         
creative problem solving and it demonstrated that       
abusive leadership, which is apparent in our data,        
cascades down organizational hierarchies (consistent     
with our perspective), and ultimately undermines      
organizational creativity [30]. Our data suggest that       
such leaders might also cultivate a collective       
bottom-line mentality among employees, resulting in      
collaborative​ ​ventures​ ​that​ ​produce​ ​unethical​ ​solutions.  
 
3.2.​ ​Implementation​ ​and​ ​Refinement​ ​of​ ​the 
Defeat​ ​Device 
 
In 2007, after ​Manager E ​and ​Manager D        
authorized the use of the defeat device, ​Manager E and          
VW ​employees presented their newly developed engine       
to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and       
California Air Resources Board (CARB) in order to        
obtain approval for marketing diesel vehicles to the        
U.S. In this meeting, ​Manager E and ​VW employees         
knowingly omitted and concealed information     
regarding the defeat device’s existence. Around the       
same time, ​Company A warns ​VW ​executive leadership        
about the illegalities of using defeat devices, though        
later works with VW to implement the software. Later         
in 2007, ​Manager E, Manager D, and ​VW ​employees         
meet to discuss which team is ultimately responsible        
for ensuring that the EA189 engine satisfies emissions        
standards. The meeting ends with ​Manager E ​arguing        
to continue developing the EA189 engine with the        
defeat device and ​Manager D formally authorizing the         
deployment of the EA189 engine. After presenting the        
EA189 engine to ​VW executives in a presentation that         
supposedly omits mention of the defeat device,       
Managers E ​and D agree to remain silent about the          
defeat device. ​Engineer B, ​who worked on the team         
that developed the defeat device, later moves to the         
U.S. to oversee testing of the new diesel vehicles. In          
2011, a supervisor (​Supervisor A, VW AG’s Quality        
Management and Product Safety supervisor​) identifies      
the defeat device and raises concerns to ​Manager B ​(a          
department head) regarding the    
illegality/risk/consequences of using the device.     
Supervisor A later becomes complicit in the       
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 concealment of the device. After receiving a letter from         
VW engineers suggesting that the defeat device       
stresses the exhaust system resulting in hardware       
failures, ​Supervisor A and ​Manager B, the head of         
engine development for the VW Passenger Cars brand,        
instruct the engineers to destroy said letter. ​Supervisor        
A​, ​Manager B​, and ​VW engineers ​then activated a         
“steering wheel angle recognition” feature to address       
the hardware failure, which allowed the vehicle to        
detect when it was undergoing testing or being driven         
on the road (when it no longer needed to operate in a            
low-emissions mode) and virtually ensured that it       
would go undetected using conventional laboratory      
methods (i.e., via dynamometer). ​VW engineers      
expressed concerns to management, particularly     
Manager B​, about this software update. Nevertheless,       
Manager B authorized the installation of the function        
and instructed ​VW ​employees ​to submit applications for        
the​ ​EPA​ ​to​ ​certify​ ​their​ ​vehicles.  
The evidence emerging from this stage helps       
explain how the number of employees contributing to a         
collaborative cheating effort increased over time –       
what we call an enveloping effect. The defeat device         
stressed equipped vehicles, indirectly revealing its      
existence to naive audience members. It is worth        
pointing out that the team that designed the defeat         
device at VW was aware that hardware failures would         
occur. Perhaps the team hoped to find a better solution          
in time (which we admit is mere speculation at this          
point in time). Nevertheless, when hardware failures       
occurred, those responsible for the defeat device had to         
address this issue. At this point in the timeline, many          
individuals had already contributed to the effort (or        
were still doing so), so for individuals uncovering the         
existence of the defeat device, a cost-benefit judgment        
had to be made in regard to contributing to the device’s           
implementation. The costs of failing to contribute (e.g.,        
losing one’s job, threatening one’s peers’ or superiors’        
livelihoods) were probably seen as excessively high.       
Subsequently, future detections brought with them an       
increasingly larger number of contributors, further      
increasing pressures to contribute to the defeat device’s        
ongoing use by raising costs of nonconformance. This        
strengthened the climate of fear and norms for        
conformity, virtually ensuring that the effort would       
envelop more people. Such an enveloping effect would        
be well-explained by threshold models of collective       
behavior [31], which note that individuals will join        
collective efforts when perceived benefits outweigh      
perceived costs of not doing so (e.g., loss of one’s job,           
displeasing one’s supervisors). Such models also      
explain the influence of authority, power, and       
conformity that were discussed previously and the       
clear escalation of unethical commitments that we see        
at this point in the case [32,33]. They may also explain           
how cooperation can promote corruption when      
partners’ self-interests are aligned – more people       
simply get involved, raising the perceived costs of        
nonconformance​ ​[34].  
 
3.3.​ ​Ongoing​ ​Concealment​ ​(and​ ​Revelation)​ ​of 
the​ ​Defeat​ ​Device 
 
The last stage of our narrative begins in 2014, when          
a study sponsored by the International Council on        
Clean Transportation (ICCT) revealed that VW      
diesel-burning vehicles emitted NOx at levels between       
5 and 35 times the allowed limit. VW headquarters in          
Wolfsburg elected to continue refining the device       
while also appearing to cooperate with U.S. regulators        
(i.e., the EPA and CARB). VW issued a recall of          
500,000 vehicles and promised to address the       
emissions anomaly. However, part of the recall       
consisted of a software update to refine the defeat         
device’s​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​evade​ ​detection.  
Going into 2015, executive leadership engaged in       
the following activities that enveloped more employees       
in the overall collaborative cheating effort: (1) They        
restricted communications within VW to prevent      
employees from revealing any awareness of a defeat        
device, (2) they provided false explanations to       
regulators for emissions non-compliance (e.g.,     
“irregularities” and “abnormalities,” (3) they formed      
ad-hoc task forces to fabricate false reasons for the         
emissions anomaly, and (4) they continued to apply for         
approvals from the EPA to sell their emissions        
non-compliant vehicles in the U.S. Eventually, an       
unnamed employee (a VW executive in the U.S.        
responsible for emissions compliance) neglected     
executive instruction to keep the device concealed and        
explained the device’s existence to CARB, forcing VW        
executives to formally reveal the software and bringing        
the​ ​device’s​ ​concealment​ ​to​ ​an​ ​abrupt​ ​end. 
This final stage in the scandal reveals a clear         
escalation of unethical organizational commitments     
involving leadership that envelops all relevant VW       
employees, and once revealed, damages VW’s      
reputation. This outcome would be foreseen by       
Cialdini [35], who proposed that each act of        
organizational dishonesty raises the probability that      
dishonesty will be found out, causing reputational       
damages. He also argued that organizational deceptions       
can affect employee turnover by encouraging      
employees who are uncomfortable with engaging in       
unethical behavior to leave while those who are        
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 comfortable with dishonesty remain, further increasing      
the probability of dishonest acts. Additionally, Cialdini       
argued that organizational leaders’ paranoia will      
increase, leading them to monitor employee behavior       
and create a climate of mistrust that harms firm         
performance. After considering our data from all three        
stages, it is clear that leaders’ monitoring behavior        
increased, particularly once there was evidence      
indicating the existence of a defeat device. Though        
supporting one of Cialdini’s claims, our data go one         
step further and suggest what we are tentatively calling         
a corrupting effect – VW leadership appeared to have         
turned a large number of employees who were initially         
uncomfortable contributing to the defeat device’s      
ongoing use into contributors to the collaborative       
cheating effort. We suspect that all of the social factors          
we have discussed thus far (e.g., abuse, conformity,        
number of individuals contributing to the collaborative       
cheating effort) helped employees to perceive high       
costs of not contributing to the collective cheating        
effort, making it easier to morally disengage from their         
ethical responsibilities. If this corrupting effect is real,        
then much research is needed to understand its        
boundary conditions and to prevent these effects from        
emerging​ ​in​ ​organizational​ ​life. 
 
4.​ ​How​ ​Collaborative​ ​Cheating​ ​Emerges​ ​in 
Organizations  
 
Our overall causal model (see Figure 1), which is         
both grounded in our data and informed by the         
literature, suggests that collaborative cheating emerges      
as a consequence of organizational leadership that, in        
response to constraints on organizational performance,      
issues credible threats to subordinates. An ethically       
permissive organizational culture (which is not      
independent from leadership) and the number of       
collaborators, which increase over time, play similar       
causal roles: they cultivate a climate of fear where         
employees’ job security is threatened [36] and a        
collective bottom line mentality where employees’      
self-interests become aligned [34], motivating them to       
pursue strategies that would secure their short-term       
self-interests. If a culture is ethically permissive, then        
unethical solutions may already exist, helping the       
collaborative cheating effort to emerge. As the       
collaborative cheating effort unfolds over time, more       
actors become aware and, upon appraising the       
costliness of failing to contribute, join the collective        
cheating effort. They then morally disengage (i.e.,       
rationalize) contributing to the effort. As the number of         
individual contributors increases, (1) the variety of       
expertise within the collective effort increases, raising       
the group’s ability to refine and sustain further        
collaborative cheating and (2) more people become at        
risk of reaching their threshold for joining the        
collective effort. Those who contribute become      
invested in sustaining the collaborative cheating effort.       
Hence, rather than leaving because they have been        
encouraged to violate their values, they remain. With a         
greater number of individuals contributing to the       
collective cheating effort(s), the organization’s use of       
deceptive tactics increase (e.g., fraudulent products or       
services), raising the risk that falsehoods will be found         
out,​ ​resulting​ ​in​ ​organizational​ ​decline.  
 
4.​ ​Discussion  
 
Our case study suggests that collaborative cheating       
is more likely to occur when organizational cultures        
and the leaders that establish them create a social         
context (e.g., climate of fear, collective bottom line        
mentality) that motivates employees to use any means        
necessary to achieve market superiority. We find that        
such leadership functions much like a tumor [35],        
causing organizational behavior that leads employees      
who seemingly have a moral compass (e.g., expressing        
displeasure with contributing to a collective cheating       
effort) to collaboratively cheat. Our study contributes       
to research on collective forms of corrupt behavior by         
showing how institutional structures (e.g., leadership)      
and social factors (e.g., culture, climate, norms) might        
foster collaborative cheating, addressing a call for       
research into collective forms of unethical behavior       
[10]. 
 
4.1.​ ​Theoretical​ ​and​ ​Practical​ ​Implications 
  
The behavioral ethics literature has been long       
informed by an ethical calculus perspective [9], which        
suggests that cost-benefit estimates inform the decision       
to cheat [7-9,11]. In this framework, individuals are        
likely to cheat if the perceived benefits of doing so          
outweigh the perceived costs. Another framework,      
grounded in social norms, suggests that the social        
context informs such decision making [8,37-40]. By       
explaining collaborative cheating behavior as an      
outcome of a cost benefit analysis that is informed by          
normative considerations [31], our study highlights a       
deep relationship between these two perspectives.      
Practically speaking, our findings suggest that      
remedies for collaborative cheating will be difficult to        
craft. Once organizational leaders commit to an       
unethical action, escalation of further commitments      
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 will likely follow, generating collective moral      
disengagement, and enveloping others, leading to ever       
riskier behavior (e.g., targeting regulations and      
regulators themselves). Organizational members may     
even grow persistently resistant to accusations of       
unethical behavior. Indeed, at least one VW executive        
denied in an interview that the VW scandal concerned         
a breach of ethics. While an obvious solution seems to          
be a change of leadership (e.g., top management team)         
and governance (e.g., board of directors), bringing this        
about​ ​is​ ​not​ ​so​ ​straightforward. 
 
4.2.​ ​Strengths,​ ​Limitations,​ ​and​ ​Directions​ ​for 
Future​ ​Research 
  
Though we aimed to systematically collect and       
analyze data to allow replicability, our study has many         
limitations that directly impinge upon our data quality        
and methodology. To address quality issues, we relied        
primarily on legal documents to craft our narrative.        
However, given the nature of our case (i.e.,        
organizational deception) there is no guarantee that       
VW employees providing data on VW’s      
inner-workings did not commit perjury. As there are        
ongoing investigations, more facts will emerge, which       
may call into question our findings and causal model.         
Therefore, our model should be viewed as preliminary        
and will be updated as more facts emerge. In regard to           
the generalizability of our process model, as our study         
consisted of a single case inside a German automaker,         
cultural-, industry-, and company-specific factors (to      
name a few) likely constrain the generalizability of our         
model. It is likely the case that our model contains          
particularisms that constrain generalizability. However,     
given that other organizations within the automotive       
industry are facing emissions cheating scandals (e.g.,       
Fiat-Chrysler, General Motors), future research     
extending our methodology to these organizations      
would​ ​test​ ​the​ ​credibility​ ​of​ ​our​ ​model. 
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Table​ ​1.​ ​Table​ ​Containing​ ​Event​ ​Data​ ​and​ ​Emergent​ ​Themes 
(#Event​ ​Number)​ ​Summary​ ​of​ ​Event​ ​Data  Emergent​ ​Themes 
(#4)​ ​​EPA​ ​​plans​ ​tighter​ ​emissions​ ​standards​ ​and​ ​sets​ ​a​ ​timeline​ ​for​ ​implementation. 
(#15)​ ​Diesel​ ​engines​ ​cannot​ ​both​ ​satisfy​ ​customer​ ​demands​ ​for​ ​power​ ​​and​​ ​comply​ ​with​ ​emissions 
standards. 
(#48)​ ​​EPA​ ​​and​ ​​CARB​​ ​refuse​ ​to​ ​approve​ ​​VW​​ ​vehicles​ ​until​ ​​VW​​ ​comes​ ​forward​ ​with​ ​explanations​ ​for 
emissions​ ​issues.  
Constraints​ ​on 
Performance/Behavior 
(#9)​ ​​Audi​​ ​engineers​ ​develop​ ​a​ ​prototypical​ ​device​ ​for​ ​defeating​ ​emissions​ ​testing,​ ​but​ ​it​ ​is​ ​not​ ​yet 
implemented.  
(#2)​ ​​VW​ ​​was​ ​fined​ ​for​ ​employing​ ​defeat​ ​devices​ ​(in​ ​1973). 
(#6​ ​&​ ​#8)​ ​​General​ ​Motors​ ​​sues​ ​​VW​ ​AG,​ ​Executive​ ​A,​ ​GM​ ​Executive​ ​A,​​ ​and​ ​other​ ​​GM​ ​employees 
over​ ​corporate​ ​espionage​ ​scandal.​ ​​VW​ ​​forced​ ​to​ ​pay​ ​$100​ ​million​ ​dollars​ ​to​ ​​GM​​ ​and​ ​to​ ​buy​ ​$1 
billion​ ​in​ ​components​ ​from​ ​one​ ​of​ ​​GM’s​ ​​companies.  
(#12)​ ​“Perks​ ​and​ ​prostitutes”​ ​scandal​ ​comes​ ​to​ ​light.​ ​VW​ ​paid​ ​for​ ​“special​ ​bonuses”—​ ​including 
expenses​ ​for​ ​prostitutes—to​ ​the​ ​chairman​ ​of​ ​the​ ​VW​ ​workers​ ​council.​ ​​Executive​ ​K,​ ​Chairman​ ​A, 
and​ ​Deputy​ ​A​ ​​all​ ​received​ ​prison​ ​sentences​ ​in​ ​the​ ​wake​ ​of​ ​the​ ​scandal.  
Ethically​ ​Permissive 
Organizational​ ​Culture 
(#18)​ ​​Executive​ ​A​ ​​(CEO​ ​of​ ​VW​ ​AG),​ ​who​ ​was​ ​infamous​ ​for​ ​firing​ ​subordinates​ ​if​ ​they​ ​did​ ​not​ ​meet 
his​ ​exact​ ​standards,​ ​threatens​ ​engineers​ ​promising​ ​to​ ​fire​ ​them​ ​if​ ​they​ ​cannot​ ​sell​ ​diesel​ ​engines​ ​in 
the​ ​U.S. 
Abusive​ ​Supervision  
(#17)​ ​Two​ ​heads​ ​of​ ​separate​ ​departments​ ​(​Manager​ ​E​ ​​&​ ​​Manager​ ​D​),​ ​knowing​ ​how​ ​the​ ​vehicles 
will​ ​be​ ​tested​ ​and​ ​recognizing​ ​that​ ​vehicles​ ​cannot​ ​satisfy​ ​power,​ ​timing,​ ​and​ ​emissions​ ​constraints, 
direct​ ​employees​ ​to​ ​design,​ ​create,​ ​and​ ​implement​ ​an​ ​engine​ ​capable​ ​of​ ​cheating​ ​the​ ​emissions​ ​test. 
Engineer​ ​B​ ​​leads​ ​the​ ​team,​ ​which​ ​obtains​ ​software​ ​from​ ​​Company​ ​A​ ​​that​ ​is​ ​turned​ ​into​ ​the​ ​defeat 
device.​ ​After​ ​being​ ​informed​ ​of​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device’s​ ​use,​ ​they​ ​(​Manager​ ​E​ ​&​ ​Manager​ ​D​)​ ​authorize 
its​ ​use. 
(#26)​ ​​Engineer​ ​B​ ​​moves​ ​to​ ​U.S.​ ​to​ ​oversee​ ​development​ ​of​ ​vehicles​ ​fitted​ ​with​ ​defeat​ ​devices.  
(#31)​ ​​Supervisor​ ​A​ ​​and​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​instruct​ ​​VW​ ​engineers​​ ​to​ ​destroy​ ​document​ ​explaining​ ​how 
defeat​ ​device​ ​causes​ ​hardware​ ​failures.  
(#34)​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​authorizes​ ​improvements​ ​to​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​software. 
(#39)​ ​​Manager​ ​C​​ ​calls​ ​a​ ​​VW​ ​employee​​ ​“crazy”​ ​for​ ​sending​ ​out​ ​an​ ​email​ ​implying​ ​knowledge​ ​of​ ​the 
defeat​ ​device,​ ​its​ ​concealment,​ ​and​ ​implicating​ ​​Manager​ ​C​ ​​and​ ​​Manager​ ​B​. 
(#51)​ ​​Manager​ ​C​​ ​misleads​ ​​CARB​​ ​by​ ​suggesting​ ​that​ ​increased​ ​emissions​ ​were​ ​due​ ​to 
“irregularities”​ ​and​ ​“abnormalities”​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​a​ ​defeat​ ​device.  
(#46​ ​&​ ​47)​ ​​Liaison​ ​A​​ ​encourages​ ​​VW​​ ​employees​ ​to​ ​think​ ​of​ ​false​ ​reasons​ ​why​ ​​VW​​ ​vehicles​ ​emit 
excessive​ ​emissions.​ ​Reiterates​ ​in​ ​a​ ​later​ ​email​ ​that​ ​they​ ​need​ ​“good​ ​arguments”​ ​to​ ​counter 
questions​ ​from​ ​U.S.​ ​regulators.  
(#50)​ ​​Executive​ ​F​​ ​provides​ ​false​ ​information​ ​pertaining​ ​to​ ​​VW​ ​AG’s​ ​​total​ ​liabilities,​ ​profit,​ ​assets, 
and​ ​shareholder’s​ ​equity. 
(#52)​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​and​ ​other​ ​co-conspirators​ ​give​ ​a​ ​script​ ​to​ ​employees​ ​meeting​ ​with​ ​CARB.​ ​This 
script​ ​specifies​ ​further​ ​concealment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​and​ ​instructs​ ​employees​ ​to​ ​obtain​ ​approval 
from​ ​CARB​ ​to​ ​​ ​sell​ ​newer​ ​vehicles​ ​that​ ​contain​ ​defeat​ ​devices.  
(#59)​​ ​Executive​ ​C​​ ​denies​ ​that​ ​the​ ​scandal​ ​is​ ​an​ ​ethical​ ​problem.  
Unethical​ ​Leadership​ ​via 
Formal​ ​(e.g., 
management 
communications, 
approvals)​ ​and​ ​Informal 
(e.g.,​ ​authority) 
Structures 
(#17)​ ​​Company​ ​A​​ ​shares​ ​prototypical​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​software​ ​with​ ​the​ ​team​ ​responsible​ ​for​ ​creating 
what​ ​became​ ​known​ ​as​ ​VW’s​ ​defeat​ ​device.  
(#19)​ ​​Manager​ ​E​​ ​and​ ​employees​ ​present​ ​EA​ ​189​ ​engine​ ​to​ ​​EPA​​ ​and​ ​​CARB​​ ​without​ ​disclosing 
defeat​ ​device’s​ ​existence.  
(#22​ ​&​ ​23)​ ​​Manager​ ​D​ ​​and​ ​​Manager​ ​E​​ ​present​ ​EA​ ​189​ ​engine​ ​to​ ​executives,​ ​omitting​ ​information 
about​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device. 
(#24)​ ​​Manager​ ​D​ ​​tells​ ​​Manager​ ​E​​ ​they​ ​will​ ​never​ ​present​ ​the​ ​information​ ​on​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​to 
anyone. 
(#37)​ ​​Manager​ ​C​​ ​notifies​ ​​Supervisor​ ​A​​ ​that​ ​ICCT​ ​members​ ​suspect​ ​cheating. 
(#38)​ ​​Manager​ ​B​,​ ​​Supervisor​ ​A​,​ ​​Manager​ ​C​,​ ​​Liaison​ ​A​,​ ​and​ ​co-conspirators,​ ​responding​ ​to 
questions​ ​from​ ​​CARB​​ ​in​ ​coordination​ ​with​ ​the​ ​EPA,​ ​elect​ ​to​ ​not​ ​disclose​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​while 
appearing​ ​to​ ​cooperate​ ​with​ ​U.S.​ ​regulators. 
(#44)​ ​​VW​ ​headquarters​​ ​in​ ​Wolfsburg​ ​uses​ ​a​ ​recall​ ​to​ ​refine​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device. 
Selective​ ​Information 
Sharing​ ​and​ ​also 
Complicit​ ​Deception​ ​by 
Means​ ​of​ ​Omission​ ​and 
Fabrication 
9 
Page 102
 (#51)​ ​​Manager​ ​C​​ ​deceives​ ​​CARB​​ ​citing​ ​technical​ ​reasons​ ​such​ ​as​ ​“irregularities”​ ​and 
“abnormalities”. 
(#52)​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​and​ ​other​ ​co-conspirators​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​script​ ​to​ ​employees​ ​who​ ​meet​ ​with​ ​​CARB​. 
The​ ​script​ ​encourages​ ​further​ ​concealment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device,​ ​which​ ​will​ ​allow​ ​VW​ ​to​ ​obtain 
approval​ ​to​ ​sell​ ​newer​ ​vehicles​ ​that​ ​still​ ​contain​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device.  
(#20)​ ​​Company​ ​A​​ ​warns​ ​​VW​​ ​executives​ ​(including​ ​​Executive​ ​B​)​​ ​​that​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​is​ ​illegal. 
Later,​ ​works​ ​with​ ​​VW​​ ​employees​ ​to​ ​create​ ​defeat​ ​device.  
(#28)​ ​​Supervisor​ ​A​​ ​explains​ ​illegality​ ​of​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​to​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​along​ ​with​ ​risks​ ​and 
consequences​ ​of​ ​using​ ​device.  
(#31)​ ​​VW​ ​engineers​​ ​give​ ​document​ ​to​ ​​Supervisor​ ​A​ ​​and​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​explaining​ ​how​ ​the​ ​defeat 
device​ ​stresses​ ​the​ ​exhaust​ ​system,​ ​resulting​ ​in​ ​hardware​ ​failures. 
(#33)​ ​​VW​​ ​​engineers​​ ​express​ ​ethical​ ​concern​ ​to​ ​management​ ​about​ ​refined​ ​defeat​ ​device,​ ​but​ ​sought 
approval​ ​from​ ​senior​ ​management​ ​(​Manager​ ​B​). 
(#53)​ ​​VW​​ ​​employee​​ ​neglects​ ​instructions​ ​from​ ​management,​ ​revealing​ ​both​ ​the​ ​existence​ ​of​ ​the 
defeat​ ​device​ ​and​ ​the​ ​conspiracy​ ​to​ ​cheat​ ​the​ ​emissions​ ​test​ ​to​ ​​CARB​.  
Expressions​ ​of​ ​Ethical 
Concerns​ ​(and 
Subsequent​ ​Relapse)​ ​– 
Moral​ ​Disengagement 
(#21)​ ​​Manager​ ​E​ ​​and​ ​​Manager​ ​D​​ ​disagree​ ​over​ ​the​ ​team​ ​responsible​ ​for​ ​ensuring​ ​emissions 
standards. 
Conflict/Confusion​ ​Over 
and​ ​Diffusion​ ​of​ ​Ethical 
Responsibility  
(#21)​ ​​Manager​ ​E​​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​production​ ​of​ ​the​ ​EA189​ ​engine​ ​should​ ​continue.​ ​​Manager​ ​D 
authorizes​ ​​Manager​ ​E​​ ​to​ ​implement​ ​defeat​ ​device.  
(#31)​ ​​Supervisor​ ​A​ ​​and​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​instruct​ ​​VW​ ​engineers​​ ​to​ ​destroy​ ​document​ ​explaining​ ​how 
defeat​ ​device​ ​causes​ ​hardware​ ​failures.  
(#32)​ ​​VW​ ​engineers​,​ ​responding​ ​to​ ​​Supervisor​ ​A​ ​​and​ ​​Manager​ ​B​’s​ ​instructions​ ​to​ ​destroy​ ​document 
explaining​ ​how​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​causes​ ​hardware​ ​failures,​ ​modify​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​by​ ​activating​ ​a 
steering​ ​wheel​ ​angle​ ​recognition​ ​feature. 
(#34)​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​authorizes​ ​improvements​ ​to​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​software. 
(#51)​ ​​Manager​ ​C​​ ​misleads​ ​​CARB​​ ​by​ ​suggesting​ ​that​ ​increased​ ​emissions​ ​were​ ​due​ ​to 
“irregularities”​ ​and​ ​“abnormalities”​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​a​ ​defeat​ ​device.  
(#46​ ​&​ ​47)​ ​​Liaison​ ​A​​ ​encourages​ ​​VW​​ ​employees​ ​to​ ​think​ ​of​ ​false​ ​reasons​ ​why​ ​​VW​​ ​vehicles​ ​emit 
excessive​ ​emissions.​ ​Reiterates​ ​in​ ​a​ ​later​ ​email​ ​that​ ​they​ ​need​ ​“good​ ​arguments”​ ​to​ ​counter 
questions​ ​from​ ​U.S.​ ​regulators.  
(#50)​ ​​Executive​ ​F​​ ​provides​ ​false​ ​information​ ​pertaining​ ​to​ ​​VW​ ​AG’s​ ​​total​ ​liabilities,​ ​profit,​ ​assets, 
and​ ​shareholders’​ ​equity. 
(#52)​ ​​Manager​ ​B​​ ​and​ ​other​ ​co-conspirators​ ​provide​ ​employees​ ​meeting​ ​with​ ​CARB​ ​with​ ​a​ ​script 
that​ ​encourages​ ​further​ ​concealment​ ​of​ ​the​ ​defeat​ ​device​ ​and​ ​might​ ​attain​ ​approval​ ​to​ ​sell​ ​newer 
vehicles​ ​that​ ​still​ ​contain​ ​defeat​ ​devices.  
Collaborative​ ​Cheating 
&​ ​Escalation​ ​of 
Unethical​ ​Commitments 
Note: ​# – refers to the event number found in the supplemental timeline (​https://osf.io/w8zyx/​), which is placed here for the                    
reader​ ​to​ ​reference​ ​if​ ​needed.​ ​Additionally,​ ​data​ ​sources​ ​are​ ​included​ ​for​ ​each​ ​event​ ​in​ ​the​ ​timeline. 
 
Figure​ ​1.​ ​How​ ​Collaborative​ ​Cheating​ ​Emerges​ ​in​ ​Organizations  
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